We present the system d, an extended type system with lambda-typed lambdaexpressions. It is related to type systems originating from the Automath project. d extends existing lambda-typed systems by an existential abstraction operator as well as propositional operators. β-reduction is extended to also normalize negated expressions using a subset of the laws of classical negation, hence d is normalizing both proofs and formulas which are handled uniformly as functional expressions. d is using a reflexive typing axiom for a constant τ to which no function can be typed. Some properties are shown including confluence, subject reduction, uniqueness of types, strong normalization, and consistency. We illustrate how, when using d, due to its limited logical strength, additional axioms must be added both for negation and for the mathematical structures whose deductions are to be formalized.
Introduction and Overview
Most typing systems contain subsystems that can be classified as instances of pure type systems (PTS) (e.g. [2] ). As one of their properties, these systems use distinct operators to form dependent products and functional (i.e. λ)-abstractions. Type systems outside of PTS using a single operator for both (i.e. λ-structured types) have been investigated in early type systems such as Λ [9] [8] , as well as more recent approaches [15] [18] . In particular [18] introduces the single-binder based ♭-cube, a variant of the β-cube which does not keep uniqueness of types, and studies λ-structured type variants of well-known systems within this framework.
The core of d is the system λ λ [14] , a reconstruction of a variation [25] of Λ, modified with a reflexive typing axiom, see Table 1 for its typing rules. As usual, we use environments Γ = (x 1 : a 1 , . . . , x n : a n ) declaring types of distinct identifiers and a β-reduction induced congruence = λ on expressions. We use the notation a[x := b] to denote the substitution of free occurrences of x in a by b. In order to emphasize its use as a type as well as an entity to which a type can be assigned, deviating from [14] we use the notation [x : a]b for the typed λ-abstraction λx : a.b and call it universal abstraction.
In contrast to other type systems with λ-structured types, d is using the axiom τ : τ for a special constant τ . This might seem very strange as the use of a reflexive axiom in combination with basic rules of PTS leads to paradoxes, e.g. [6] [17] , see also [2] (Section 5.5). However, as will be seen, in our context of extended λ-structured types, the axiom τ : τ acts as a seed for deriving valid (i.e. typable) expressions and leads to a consistent system. Unlike instances of PTS (e.g. [22] ), systems with λ-structured types have never been extended by existential or classical propositional operators. In this paper we present a possible extension the core of which is motivated by means of two typing sequences as follows:
First, there is an extension to the λ λ -induced typing sequence Γ ⊢ [x!a] b is typed to the infinite conjunction of these elements types [x : a]c (this leads to an extension of β-reduction, see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). We obtain the following typing sequence: In addition to the type-elimination of universal abstraction by means of application (a b), operators of projection a.1 and a.2 are introduced as type-eliminators for existential abstraction. Second, d adds a product [a, b] as a binary analogon of the infinite aggregation [x : a]b. We use the tuple notation [a, b] due to the use of products both in the role of element and of type. Similarly to the typing sequence above, there is an analogous typing sequence of binary aggregations: Expressions a 1 : b 1 and a 2 : b 2 may be used within injections [a 1 , : b 2 ], [: b 1 , a 2 ], which type to a sum [b 1 + b 2 ]. The bracket notation is extended to injections and sums for coherence. Sums type to products [c 1 , c 2 ], products type to products, and so on 2 :
Γ ⊢ a 1 : b 1 :
: . . . Type-elimination is extended by using projections for products and a case distinction operator [a ? b] for sums. Furthermore, to support common mathematical reasoning practices, d introduces a classical negation operator ¬a and additional reduction rules to transform expressions into a negation normal form. The most important rules are the following:
Here → denotes the extended β-reduction used in d. Hence d is normalizing both proofs and formulas which are handled uniformly as functional expressions. Normalization of negation expressions as such does not yield all logical properties of negation, rather one has to assume additional axioms about negation. Similarly, due to the limited strength of d, additional axioms must also be added for the mathematical structures whose deductions are to be formalized (for both see Section 4) .
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we motivate the basic differences to PTS. A formal definition of d is presented in Section 3 and several application examples are shown in Section 4. The main part of the paper (Section 5) contains proofs of confluence, subject reduction, uniqueness of types, strong normalization, and consistency.
Motivation of core concepts
To understand the starting point of d, consider the rules of pure type systems (PTS) (e.g. [2] ) summarized in Table 2 which are the basis for a large class of typed systems often used to formalize deductions 3 . In the rules of Table 2 , A, the set of axioms, is a set of pairs (s 1 , s 2 ), where s i are from a set of sort S; and R, the set of rules, is a set of pairs (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) where s i ∈ S. Many instances of these typing systems allow for representing deductions as well-sorted λ-expressions which reduce to a unique normal form with respect to β-reduction, e.g. [2] .
The first deviation from PTS that is characteristic for the system λ λ is to use a single abstraction operator on all levels which we will denote as universal abstraction and write as [x : a]b. Some of the resulting types of systems have been studied as ♭-cubes in [18] . Semantically, a universal abstractions can be seen as a function specified by a λ-expression 4 . As a consequence, typing does not correspond to set inclusion any more but becomes a relation between functions. This means that types become roles that functions can play in this relation. Consequently, β-equality can now be applied also to functions playing the role of types. Merging the abstraction mechanisms would lead to the following adapted typing rules, replacing the rules product, application, and abstraction. a]c An important reason that this unification works is that universal abstraction acts as introduction operator for itself. We will see later how this becomes more complex when existential operators are introduced. Note also that product ′ and abstraction ′ together would violate uniqueness of types [18] : This motivates the second difference of λ λ w.r.t. PTS which is to reject the rule product ′ . The third and final difference to PTS that is characteristic for λ λ is to drop the set of sorts S and strengthen the rule abstraction ′ to allow using any typable universal abstraction in its premise. The rules weakening, conversion, and start are adapted accordingly. This leads to the rules shown in Table 1 . Similar kind of choices are included in the system λδ [15] .
d deviates from λ λ by setting S = {τ } and A = {(τ, τ )} instead of S = {τ, κ} and A = {(τ, κ)}. It will turn out that rejection of the rule product ′ is the key reason for avoiding paradoxes related to τ : τ 5 .
Definition
First we define syntax and some basic notions such as free occurrences of variables. We then define the congruence relation a ≃ b as transitive and symmetric closure of a reduction relation a → b. Finally we define contexts Γ and the typing relation Γ ⊢ a : b.
3.1. Basic definitions. is a case distinction, and ¬a is a negation. For the sake of succinctness and homogenity in the following definitions we are using some additional notations for groups of operations:
⊕(a 1 , . . . , a n ) stands for a 1 . If one of these notations is used more than once in an equation or inference rule it always denotes the same concrete operation.
Definition 3.2 (Free identifiers, substitution). Identifiers occurring in an expression which do not occur in the range of a binding occur free in the expression. FV (a) which denotes the set of free identifiers of an expression a is defined as follows:
. . , a n )) = FV (a 1 ) ∪ . . . ∪ FV (a n ) FV (⊕ x (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = FV (a 1 ) ∪ . . . ∪ FV (a n−1 ) ∪ (FV (a n )\{x})
Note that in a protected definition [x .
= a 1 , a 2 : a 3 ] the binding of x is for a 3 only. The substitution a[x := b] of all free occurrences of identifier x in expression a by expression b is defined as follows:
A substitution a[x := b] may lead to name clashes in case an identifier y occurring free in the inserted expression b comes into the range of a binding of y in the original expression. These name clashes can be avoided by renaming of identifiers. y / ∈ FV (a) ⊕ x (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ≃ α ⊕ y (a 1 , . . . , a n )[x y] Remark 3.5 (Implicit renaming, name-independent representations). In order not to clutter the presentation, we will write identifiers as strings but always assume appropriate renaming of bound identifiers in order to avoid name clashes. This assumption is justified because one could also use a less-readable but name-independent presentation of expressions using e.g. de Bruijn indexes [8] which would avoid the necessity of renaming all together.
3.2.
Reduction and congruence. The most basic semantic concept defines the reduction of an expression into a more basic expression. We will later show that reduction, if it terminates, always leads to a unique result.
Definition 3.6 (Single-step reduction). Single-step reduction a → 1 b is the smallest relation satisfying the axioms and inference rules of Table 3 . The reduction axioms β 1 and β 2 reflect the identical functional interpretation of universal and existential abstractions. The complementary logical interpretation of these operations will be reflected in the typing rules
. . , a n ) Table 3 : Axioms and rules for single-step reduction.
to come. A similar remark applies to axioms π 3 to π 6 . The axioms β 3 and β 4 extend the interpretation of application for realizing case distinctions. Similarly π 1 and π 2 extend projection to protected definitions.
d is encoding into its reduction relation some logical equivalence laws (ν 1 to ν 5 ) involving negation, thus defining a procedure of normalization with respect to negation. In order to avoid many uninteresting variations of normal forms we also add the axioms (ν 6 ) to (ν 10 ) stating that the application of negation to the primitive constant, protected definitions, injections, case distinctions does not yield any effect. These rules define many negated formulas as equivalent which helps to eliminate many routine applications of logical equivalences in deductions. However, these rules have the consequence that the direct encoding of the negation of a as [x : a]ff , where ff abbreviates [x : τ ]x, becomes problematic, since, for example, the axiom ν 1 would then imply that [x : [y : a]ff ]ff → 1 a and hence we could derive the following two reductions obviously violating the confluence property of reduction.
Definition 3.7 (Reduction). Reduction a → b of an expression a to b is defined as the reflexive and transitive closure of single-step reduction a → 1 b. We use the notation a → b → c . . . to indicate reduction sequences. If two expressions reduce to a common expression we write a∇b. To show argument sequences in arguments about reduction we use the notation a 1 = . . . = a n → b 1 = . . . = b m → c 1 = . . . = c k . . . to indicate equality of expressions in reduction sequences. This will also be used for sequences of n-step reductions → n and accordingly for sequences containing both notations.
Definition 3.8 (Congruence). Congruence of expressions, denoted by a ≃ b, is defined as the symmetric and transitive closure of reduction. The notations for reduction sequences are extended to contain congruences as well.
3.3. Typing and Validity. Definition 3.9 (Context). A context, denoted by Γ, is a finite sequence of declarations (x 1 : a 1 , . . . , x n : a n ), where x i are identifiers with x i = x j and a i are expressions. The assumption about name-free representation of bound identifiers justifies the uniqueness assumption. The lookup of an identifier in a context Γ(x) is a partial function defined by Γ(x i ) = a i . dom(Γ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and ran(Γ) = {a 1 , . . . , a n } denote the domain and range of a context Γ. Γ, x : a denotes the extension of Γ on the right by a binding x : a where x is an identifier not yet declared in Γ. Γ 1 , Γ 2 denotes the concatenation of two contexts declaring disjoint identifiers. The empty context is written as ().
[Γ]a = [x 1 : a 1 ] · · · [x 1 : a n ]a denotes the abstraction of a context over an expression.
Definition 3.10 (Typing). Typing Γ ⊢ a : b of a to b, the type of a, under a context Γ is the smallest ternary relation on contexts and two expressions satisfying the inference rules of Table 4 . We often use the notation Γ ⊢ a 1 = . . . = a n : b 1 = . . . = b m to indicate arguments about equality of expressions in proofs about the typing relation. In the above notation, we sometimes use ≃ instead of =.
The rules ax, start, weak, conv, abs U , and appl are taken from Table 1 and have been motivated in Section 2. We now explain the remaining typing rules.
Existential abstraction.
A first approximation of the corresponding typing rule would be to use a tuple to introduce existential abstractions:
However, this rule is inappropriate in our setting as it allows for many incompatible types of the same expression and thus violates uniqueness of types, for example: = a, c : d] where we allow d, but not c to use the identifier x. The second attempt for the typing rule then becomes
The rule def is obtained by adding a condition about the typability of d. The elimination rules ch I and ch B are relatively straightforward and similar to common rules for Σ types, e.g. [22] . Note that logically left-projection has similarities to a skolem function and rightprojection can be seen as a skolemisation operator 6 .
Finally, we need to define a typing rule for existential abstraction itself. With respect to type elimination, an expression of type [x!a]b embodies a proof of b for some concrete expression a 0 : a. However, with respect to type introduction, i.e. when playing the role of an elements, an expression [x!a]b has the logical strength identical to a universal abstraction: it is a function which given some x : a produces a b : c, hence we use the rule abs E . The rule abs E has the effect that existential abstractions can now be instantiated as elements in the elimination rule for universal abstraction, i.e. appl can be instantiated as follows:
Hence, we have extended β-equality to existential abstractions leading to the axiom β 2 . Note that this does not lead to logical inconsistency because from x : [y!a]b and z : a one cannot conclude (x z) : ([y!a]b z).
One might ask why not type an existential abstraction [x!a]b to an existential abstraction [x!a]c (assuming x : a ⊢ b : c)? This would logically be invalid since we could prove existential statements by magic, i.e. without providing an instance expressions 7 . The discussion about the typing rules for abstractions can be summarized as follows: 7 Actually it is quite easy to see such a rule would lead to inconsistency. First, the type • From the point of view of reduction, universal abstraction and existential abstraction both share the properties of λ-abstraction. • From the point of view of typing, when playing the role of a type, universal abstraction is its own introducer and existential abstraction requires a proof of a concrete instance in its introduction rule, however when playing the role of an element, universal abstraction and existential abstraction have identical types.
3.3.2.
Products and sums. Product and sum are seen as finite counterparts of the corresponding abstraction operators. This is reflected in the rules prd, sum, pr L , and pr R and the axioms π 3 to π 6 .
3.3.3. Negation. While the rule neg is obvious, note that the reduction rules for negation yield a subset of the properties of negation only, e.g. it is not possible to produce an expression of type [x : τ ][x + ¬x]. Therefore one has to assume additional axioms (see Section 4) 8 .
Definition 3.11 (Validity). Validity Γ ⊢ a of an expression a under a context Γ is defined as the existence of a type:
Similarly to typing we use the notation Γ 1 = . . . = Γ n ⊢ a 1 = . . . = a n to indicate arguments about equality of contexts and expressions in proofs about validity. Similarly for congruence ≃ or combinations of both. We also use the notation Γ ⊢ a 1 , . . . , a n as an abbreviation for Γ ⊢ a 1 , . . ., Γ ⊢ a n . As for typing, we also omit writing the empty context.
Examples
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the basic style of axiomatizing theories and describing deductions when using d. Note that the example are presented with fully explicit expressions of d, i.e. we do not omit any subexpressions which could be inferred from other parts using pattern matching or proof tactics and we do not use a module concept for theories. Such features should of course be part of any practically useful approach for formal deductions based on d. a 1 ] · · · [x n : a n ]a as [x 1 : a 1 ; · · · ; x n : a n ]a and [x 1 : a] · · · [x n : a]b as [x 1 , · · · , x n : a]b and similar for existential abstractions. We also use combinations of these abbreviations such that e.g.
. Similarly, we write [a 1 ⊢ · · · [a n ⊢ a] · · · ] as [a 1 ; · · · ; a n ⊢ a]. We write nested applications (· · · ((a a 1 ) a 2 ) · · · a n ) as (a a 1 · · · a n ). We also write Γ ⊢ a : b as a : b if Γ is empty or clear from the context. When writing a : b (name) we introduce name as abbreviation for a of type b. 8 In Section 6.3 we discuss the problems of internalizing the complete properties of negation into d. , and ¬a, show many properties of logical implication, conjunction, disjunction, and negation. For example, the following laws can be derived for arbitrary well-typed expressions a, b. We begin with laws whose deduction is trivial because they are directly built into the type introduction rules and/or the reduction relation:
Next we present some laws which follow directly from using an elimination rule:
(sym a,b )
We continue with some properties involving the necessity of additional negation axioms. In principle many different axioms schemes are possible. For example, one could be inspired by the rules for negation in sequent calculus (A stands for a sequence of formulas A 1 , . . .,
Theses rule together with the negations axioms inspire the following axiom schemes:
where ¬ + a,b , ¬ − a,b ∈ I are from a infinite set of identifiers I Ax indexed over expressions a and b. Formally, typing a to b under the above axiom scheme could be defined so as to require that FV (b) = ∅ and that there is a context Γ consisting of (a finite sequence of) declarations of identifiers from I Ax with the above type mappings, such that Γ ⊢ a : b. Assuming this axiom scheme we can now show for example the following two properties:
The operators [x : a]b and [x!a]b show the properties of universal and existential quantification. We begin with two properties which relate the existential abstraction operator with its propositional counterpart. Note that due to the double negation axiom ν 1 the corresponding equivalence for universal abstractions follows directly from the negation axioms ( * ).
The expected properties of logical falsehood ff := [x : τ ]x and logical truth tt := ¬ff follow almost directly:
In the proof of tt note that tt ≃ 
Here S is an identifier used to abstract over the type of the expressions to be equal. Note that, for better readability, we use the infix notation x = S y, introduced by a declaration Note that, for better readability, we use infix notations n + m and n * m abbreviating the expressions (+ n m) and ( * n m). As an example, a simple property can be (tediously) deduced under the context (Equality, Naturals, n : N ) where 1 := (s 0): An definition of law can be derived from the axioms in a style similar (and even more tedious) to the above deduction. This deduction of the property about even numbers is correct since
Finally, an induction principle can be added to the context as follows:
4.4. Casting types to the primitive constant. In many cases, the constraint of universally quantified variables to be of primitive type, i.e. x : τ , can be relaxed to arbitrary well typed expressions a : b using an operation to cast arbitrary types to τ . For this reason we introduce an axiom scheme for a τ -casting operator () a 9 and we also assume the axioms schemes () + a and () − a essentially stating equivalence between casted and uncasted types:
As an application, we can generalize the property of ff in Section 4.1 to arbitrary well-typed a:
x
As an another example, assuming one already has axiomatized the more general theory of integers, e.g. with type Int, a constant 0 I , and the usual relation ≥, one could instantiate the declarations of the context Naturals using casting as follows:
4.5. Formalizing partial functions. In the previous section we have used the application operator in d to model the application of total functions. As an example of a partial function consider the predecessor function on natural numbers. To introduce this function in d, several approaches come to mind:
• The predecessor function can be axiomatized as a total function over the type N .
The (potential) problem of this approach is the interpretation of (p 0) which may lead to unintuitive or harmful consequences. Furthermore, if additional axioms are to be avoided, the declaration of p must eventually by instantiated by some (total) function which defines a value for 0. • The predecessor function can be defined with an additional argument formalizing the condition.
While mathematically clean, this definition requires to always provide an additional argument c when using the predecessor function. • As a variant of the previous approach, the additional argument can be hidden into an adapted type of the predecessor function.
While mathematically clean, this approach requires a more complex handling of the argument n : N >0 when using the predecessor function. 9 For a discussion of axioms schemes see also Section 4.1)
Which of these (or other) approaches is best to use seems to depend on the organization and the goals of the formalization at hand. 4.6. Defining functions from deductions. Note that while the predecessor function can be directly defined, more complex functions and their (algorithmic) properties can be derived from the proofs of properties. As a sketch of an example consider the following well-known property
where (gcd k x y) denotes the property that k is the greatest common divisor of x and y. Given a (not necessarily constructive) deduction P GCD of type GCD, one can then define the greatest common divisor x ↓ y and define deductions d 1 and d 2 proving well-known algorithmic properties.
Sets. When formalizing mathematical deductions, besides natural number and equality one needs formal systems for many more basic structures of mathematics. For examples, sets can be axiomatized by the following context using a formalized set comprehension principle.
Note that, for better readability, we use the notation x ∈ S y and {P } S abbreviating the expressions ((.) ∈ (.) (.) S x y) and ({(.)} (.) S P ). One can now define various sets using set comprehension. Note the use of the τ -casting operator to ensure the set-defining properties are of type τ .
Properties of individual elements can be deduced based on the axiom O, for example we can extract the property P := [n!N ](x = N 2 * n) of a member of Even using the cast-removal axiom as follows (where Even P := [x : N ](() [y!N ]τ (even x)):
Note that in this formalization of sets the axiom of choice can be immediately derived as follows: We assume the usual assumptions
and under this context Γ deduce
Note also that a alternative definition of naturals from integers can be given with sets as follows:
4.8. Proof structuring. To illustrate some proof structuring issues, we formalize the property of being a group as follows (writing [a 1 , a 2 , · · · ] for [a 1 , [a 2 , · · · ]]):
As an example, we can show that +, −, and 0 form a group. Obviously, we can construct a deduction ded with Equality, Integers ⊢ ded : P g where Integers is the context Naturals extended with a subtraction operator a − b with corresponding axioms and where P g describes the group laws:
ded can be turned into a proof of (Group N ) as follows:
It is well-known that the left-neutral element is also right-neutral, this means, when assuming g to be a group over S there is a proof p such that
Here g.1 is the * function of g and g.2.1 is the neutral element of g. Note that the use of existential declarations is supporting the proof structuring as it hides * and e in the assumptions inside the g : (Group S) assumption. On the other hand, one has to explicitly access the operators using .1 and .2. p can be abstracted to an inference p ′ := [S : τ ; g : (Group S)]p about a derived property of groups as follows:
Hence we can instantiate p ′ to obtain the right-neutrality property of 0 for integers.
Properties
In this Section we show confluence of reduction, several properties of typing, including uniqueness of types, and strong normalisation of valid, i.e. typable, expressions. Based on these properties we show consistency of d in the sense that no expression is typing to [x : τ ]x under the empty context. We show the main proof ideas and indicate important steps in detail, significantly more detail can be found in [32] .
Remark 5.1 (Inductive principles). Besides structural induction on the definition of E, we will mainly use structural induction on expressions with context when showing a property P (Γ, a) of expressions. We will make use of the following inductive inference rules P (Γ, a 1 ) P (Γ, a n ) P (Γ, ⊕(a 1 , . . . , a n )) P (Γ, a 1 ) P (Γ, a n−1 ) P ((Γ, x : a 1 ), a n ) P (Γ, ⊕ x (a 1 , . . . , a n )) We frequently show properties about reduction relations by induction on the definition of single-step reduction. Similarly for properties about typing.
Remark 5.2 (Renaming of identifiers). Typically when we prove a property using some axiom, inference rule, or derived property, we just mention the identifier or this axiom, rule or, property and then use it with an instantiation renaming its identifiers so as to avoid name clashes with the proposition to be shown. In order not to clutter the presentation, these renamings are usually not explicitly indicated.
Remark 5.3 (Introduction of auxiliary identifiers). We usually explicitly introduce all auxiliary identifiers appearing in deduction steps. However, there are two important exceptions.
• When using structural induction, if we consider a specific operator and decompose an expression a e.g. by a = ⊕(a 1 , , . . . , a n ) we usually implicitly introduce the new auxiliary identifiers a i . • When using induction on the definition of reduction, if we consider a specific axiom or structural rule which requires a syntactic pattern we usually implicitly introduce the new auxiliary identifiers necessary for this pattern.
We begin with some basic properties of substitution and its relation to reduction.
Lemma 5.4 (Basic properties of substitution). For all a, b, c and x, y:
Proof. Proof is straightforward by structural induction on a. Proof. Proof is straightforward by induction on the definition of single-step reduction.
Next we show basic decomposition properties of reduction.
Lemma 5.6 (Reduction decomposition). For all a 1 , . . . , a n , b, b 1 , . . . , b n and x:
and c 4 , one of the following cases
Proof. Straightforward inductions, as these properties are very close to the definition of the reduction relation.
Lemma 5.7 (Reduction decomposition for negation). For all a 1 , . . . , a n , b, b 1 , . . . , b n and x:
Confluence of reduction.
Well-known confluence proofs for untyped λ-calculus could be used, e.g. [2] could be adapted to include the operators of d. Due to the significant number of reduction axioms of d, we use an alternative approach using explicit substitutions and an auxiliary relation of reduction with explicit substitution which has detailed substitution steps (this approach was basically already adopted in the Automath project [9] ) and which comprises sequences of negation-related reduction-steps into single steps. The underlying idea is that reduction with explicit substitution can be shown to be directly confluent which implies its confluence. We then show that this implies confluence of reduction a → b. There are several approaches to reduction with explicit substitutions, e.g. [1] [20] . The approach below is different as it does not reduce over the recursive definition of substitution expressions but rather uses substitution expressions to introduce a definitional environment to explicitly unfold single substitution instances and then discard substitution expressions when all instances are unfolded. We begin by defining expressions with substitution. The function computing free identifiers (Definition 3.2) is extended so as to treat internalized substitutions identical to abstractions.
The renaming function (Definition 3.3) is extended analogously.
As for expressions we will write identifiers as strings but always assume appropriate renaming of bound identifiers in order to avoid name clashes. In order to define reduction with explicit substitution as a directly confluent relation, we first define the auxiliary notion of negation-reduction a → ¬ b which comprises application sequences of axioms ν 1 , . . ., ν 5 in a restricted context. Definition 5.9 (Negation-reduction). Single-step negation-reduction a → ¬ 1 b is the smallest relation on expressions with explicit substitution satisfying the axiom and the inference rules of Table 5 . n-step negation-reduction a → ¬ n b (n ≥ 0) and negation-reduction a → ¬ b are 
Not surprisingly, negation-reduction is confluent.
Proof. The proof of confluence of → ¬ is straightforward by induction on the size S (a) which counts all nodes and leaves of a's expression tree 10 . For the inductive base, the case S (a) = 1 is obviously true. Consider an expression a with S (a) = n > 0 and assume confluence for all expressions b with S (b) < S (a). By systematic investigation of critical pairs one can show local confluence of → ¬ from a. Furthermore, → ¬ is terminating from a which can be seen by defining a weight function that squares the weight (incremented by one) in case of negations. Hence one can apply the diamond lemma [26] to obtain confluence of → ¬ for a, which completes the inductive step.
In order to define reduction with explicit substitution, we need to introduce the notion of environments, which are used to record the definitions which are currently available for substitution.
The lookup of an identifier in an Environment is defined by E(x) = a i . E, x := a denotes the extension of E on the right by a definition x := a. E 1 , E 2 denotes the concatenation of two environments. The empty environment is written as (). Similar to induction with context we will use induction with environment.
Definition 5.12 (Single-step reduction with explicit substitution). Single-step reduction reduction with explicit substitution E ⊢ a → := 1 b is the smallest relation on expressions with explicit substitution satisfying the axiom and the inference rules of Table 6 . Compared to (general) reduction →, the axiom β 1 and β 2 have been decomposed into several axioms:
• β µ 1 and β µ 2 are reformulation of β 1 and β 2 using internalized substitution • use is unfolding single usages of definitions • rem is removing a definition without usage The axioms ν 1 , . . . , ν 5 , which are not directly confluent e.g. for ¬¬[a, b], have been removed and replaced by the rule ν. Furthermore there are two more structural rules (L := ) and (R := ) related to substitution. Note that the rule (R := ) is pushing a definition onto the environment E when evaluating the body of a definition. Zero-or-one-step reduction with explicit substitution and n-step reduction with explicit substitution are defined as follows
. Remark 5.14 (Avoidance of name clashes through appropriate renaming). Note that renaming is necessary to prepare use of the axiom use: For example when → := -reducing Reduction (→) can obviously be embedded into → := .
Lemma 5.15 (Reduction implies reduction with explicit substitution). For all a, b:
Proof. Proof is by induction on the definition of a → b. consider those cases in which there exists a c such that a → ¬ 1 c (see Table 5 ). In case of the axioms ν 1 to ν 5 the proposition follows directly. In case of the rules for a = [a 1 ⊕ a 2 ] or a = ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ) the proposition follows either immediately or from the inductive hypothesis. In case of the rule for a = ¬a 1 the proposition follows from confluence of negation-reduction (Lemma 5.10).
It remains to prove the main property by induction on the length n of a → ¬ n c: In case of n = 0 the property is trivial. Otherwise, let E ⊢ a → Due to the definition of → := 1 , critical pairs of E ⊢ a → := 1 b and E ⊢ a → := 1 c in which at least one of the steps is using axiom ν on top-level, i.e. where ∃k > 0 : a → ¬ k b or ∃k > 0 : a → ¬ k c, can be resolved thanks to Lemmas 5.10 and 5.17. Note also that the reduction axioms and rules of → := do not duplicate on their right hand side any element appearing on the left hand side, hence the axiom use may never violate direct confluence in a critical pair.
We show the interesting cases of explicit definitions and applications, the other cases are straightforward.
• a = [x := a 1 ]a 2 : The matching axiom and rules are rem, L := , and R := . The use of L := versus R := follow directly from the inductive hypothesis. The interesting cases are the use of rem, versus L := or R := : Hence we may assume that x / ∈ FV (a 2 ) and need to consider the following cases: Table 6 ) but without the rule ν and without any axioms except rem and use. As an immediate consequence of confluence we note some basic properties of congruence. (2) ⊕ x (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ≃ ⊕ y (b 1 , . . . , b n ) iff x = y and a i ≃ b i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Consequence of Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6, and of Theorem 5.26.
5.2.
Properties of typing. We frequently show properties of typing by induction on the definition of typing where the inductive base corresponds to the typing axiom and the inductive step corresponds to one of the inference rules of typing. We begin by two properties (5.28,5.29) related to the rule weak, a property (5.30) related to the rule start, and a property (5.31) related to the rule conv.
Lemma 5.28 (Context weakening). For all Γ 1 , Γ 2 , x, a, b, c:
Proof. Proof is by induction on the definition of (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a : b. For all the different typing rules the property follows directly from the definition of typing and the inductive hypothesis.
For all the different typing rules the property follows directly from the definition of typing and the inductive hypothesis. Proof. Let Γ a and Γ b where a ≃ b and Γ 1 ⊢ b as defined above: The property is shown by induction on the definition of (Γ 1 , x : a, Γ 2 ) ⊢ c : d. In all cases, the property follows directly from the definition of typing and the inductive hypothesis.
Next we list several decomposition properties of typing and of validity.
Lemma 5.32 (Typing decomposition). For all Γ, x, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , b: Proof. In all cases the proof is by induction on the definition of typing or by a straightforward application of previous properties. In particular, Lemmas 5.6, 5.26, and 5.28 are needed.
Lemma 5.33 (Validity decomposition). For all Γ, x, a 1 , . . . , a n :
(1) Γ ⊢ ⊕(a 1 , , . . . a n ) implies Γ ⊢ a 1 , . . ., Γ ⊢ a n .
Proof. In all cases the proof is by induction on the definition of typing or by a straightforward application of previous properties. In particular, the rule 5.29 is needed.
A central prerequisite to the proof of closure of reduction and typing against validity is the following substitution property of typing. In order to state the property, we need an auxiliary definition. 
We can now argue as follows:
The other cases can be shown in a similar style.
We begin the closure properties with the relatively straightforward property that validity is closed against typing We are now ready to show the preservation of types under a reduction step. 
: c then follows by applying rule conv. We show the cases of axiom β 1 and of structural rule ⊕ x ( , ) 1 in detail:
• a 3 ) : c. The other cases can be shown in a similar style using also Lemma 5.5.
A simple inductive argument extends this property to general reduction. This property is often referred to as subject reduction. Proof. Proof by induction on the number of reduction steps in a → n b using Lemma 5.37. Subject reduction can be reformulated using the validity notation. A straightforward argument leads to a closure result of validity w.r.t. context reduction. Before we show uniqueness of types, we need a Lemma about the effect of removing unnecessary type declarations from a context.
Lemma 5.40 (Validity is closed against context reduction). For all
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of (Γ 1 , x : c, Γ 2 ) ⊢ a : b. We show two interesting cases • Rule conv:
This can be graphically illustrated as follows: FV ((a 1 a 2 ) ) we know that x / ∈ FV (a 1 ) ∪ FV (a 2 ). By inductive hypothesis (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a 1 : e ′ for some e ′ where [y : d]e → e ′ and (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a 2 : d ′ for some d ′ where d → d ′ . By Lemma 5.6(1) we know that e ′ = [y : d 1 ]e 1 for some d 1 and e 1 where d → d 1 and e → e 1 . By Theorem 5.26 we therefore know that d ′ → d 2 and d 1 → d 2 for some d 2 .
We will show (Γ 1 ,
. According to rule appl, this requires to show that a 2 has a type which matches the domain of a 1 (both under (Γ 1 , Γ 2 )).
By Lemma 5.36 we know that (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ [y : d 1 ]e 1 . By Lemma 5.39 we know that also (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ [y : d 2 ]e 1 . Since (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a 1 : e ′ = [y : d 1 ]e 1 , we can apply rule conv to infer that (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a 1 : [y : d 2 ]e 1 . From (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ [y : d 2 ]e 1 by Lemma 5.33(2) we know that (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ d 2 . Hence we can apply rule conv to infer that (Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) ⊢ a 2 : d 2 .
Hence by definition of typing (appl) we know that (Γ 1 , We can now show uniqueness of types. Most cases are straightforward, except for the weakening rule where we need the context contraction result above. Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of Γ ⊢ a : b. We show three interesting cases: In each case, if we look at a typing rule Γ ⊢ a : b we have to show that if also Γ ⊢ a : c then b ≃ c.
• Rule start: 
Let Γ ⊢ (a 1 a 2 ) : c. By Lemma 5.32 (6) we know that c ≃ c 2 [y := a 2 ] for some c 1 , c 2 where Γ ⊢ a 1 : [y : c 1 ]c 2 and Γ ⊢ a 2 : c 1 . By inductive hypothesis applied to Γ ⊢ a 1 :
Hence obviously x = y and by basic properties of congruence (Lemma 5.27(2)) it follows that b 2 ≃ c 2 . Using Lemma 5.27 (1) 
Strong normalization.
The idea for the proof of strong normalization of valid expressions in d is to classify expressions according to structural properties, in order to make an inductive argument work. For this purpose we define structural skeletons called norms as the subset of expressions built from the primitive τ and binary products only and we define a partial function assigning norms to expressions. Norms are a reconstruction of a concept of simple types, consisting of atomic types and product types, within d. Analogously to simple types, norms provide a handle to classify valid expressions into different degrees of structural complexity. The idea of the strong normalisation argument is first to prove that all valid expressions are normable, i.e they are in the domain of the norming function, and then to prove that all normable expressions are strongly normalizable, i.e they are not the origin of an infinite reduction sequence.
The good news is that in d we are not dealing with unconstrained parametric types as for example in System F (see e.g. [12] ), and therefore we will be able to use more elementary methods to show strong normalisation as used for the simply typed lambda calculus. A common such method is to define a notion of reducible expressions satisfying certain reducibility conditions suitable for inductive arguments both on type structure and on reduction length, to prove that all reducible expressions satisfy certain reducibility properties including strong normalisation, and then to prove that that all typable expressions are reducible ( [29] , [11] ). We will basically adopt this idea, but the bad news is that common definitions of reducibility (e.g. [12] ) apparently cannot be adapted to include the reduction of negation. A more suitable basis for our purposes was found to be the notion of computable expressions as defined in language theoretical studies of Automath [31] , see also [30] . This approach is basically extended here to cover additional operators, including negation.
We motivate the basic idea of the proof (precise definitions can be found below): Consider the following condition necessary to establish strong normalization for an application (a b) in the context of an inductive proof (where S denotes the set of strongly normalizable expressions):
• Similarly, the following condition is necessary to establish strong normalization for a negation ¬a in the context of an inductive proof.
• If a → [x : c 1 ]c 2 ∈ S then ¬c 2 ∈ S. These and other properties inspire the definition of the set of computable expressions C Γ which are normable, strongly normalizable, and satisfy the property that a, b ∈ C Γ implies ¬a, (a b) ∈ C Γ . Unfortunately, the closure properties of computable expressions do not include existential and universal abstraction. Instead, we need to prove the stronger property that normable expressions are computable under norm-preserving substitutions of their free variables to computable expressions.
This property implies that all normable expressions are computable and therefore that normability and computability are equivalent notions. The logical relations between the various notions can be summarized as follows:
We begin with some basic definitions and properties related to strong normalization.
Definition 5.43 (Strongly normalizable expressions). The set of strongly normalizable expressions is denoted by S. An expression a is in S iff there is no infinite sequence of one-step reductions a → 1 a 1 → 1 a 2 → 1 a 3 . . . Proof. These properties can be shown through a proof by contradiction using elementary properties of reduction (Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6).
Next we show conditions under which applications and negations are strongly normalizing.
Lemma 5.45 (Strong normalization conditions).
(1) For all a, b ∈ S: (a b) ∈ S if for any c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 , and x, the following conditions are satisfied:
For all a ∈ S: ¬a ∈ S if for any b and c, the following conditions are satisfied:
Proof. These properties can be shown through a proof by contradiction using elementary properties of reduction (Lemmas 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7) and of strong normalisation (Lemma 5.44).
Norms are a subset of expressions representing structural skeletons of expressions. Norms play an important role to classify expressions in the course of the proof of strong normalization.
Definition 5.46 (Norm, norming, normable expressions). The set of normsĒ is generated by the following rulesĒ
ObviouslyĒ ⊂ E. We will use the notationā,b,c, . . . to denote norms. The partial norming function a Γ defines for some expressions a the norm of a under an environment Γ. It is defined by the equations in Table 7 . The partial norming function is well-defined, in the Table 7 : Norming sense that one can show by structural induction on a with context Γ that, if defined, a Γ is unique. An expression a is normable relative under context Γ iff a Γ is defined. This is written as Γ |= a. Similarly to typing we use the notation Γ |= a 1 , . . . , a n as an abbreviation for Γ |= a 1 , . . ., Γ |= a n . We show several basic properties of normable expressions culminating in the property that all valid expressions are normable. Some of these properties and proofs are structurally similar to the corresponding ones for valid expressions. However, due to the simplicity of norms, the proofs are much shorter.
Lemma 5.48 (Norm equality in context). Let Γ a = (Γ 1 , x : a, Γ 2 ) and
Proof. The straightforward proof is by structural induction on the definition of c Γa .
Lemma 5.49 (Substitution and norming). Let Γ a = (Γ 1 , x : a, Γ 2 ) and
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on the definition of c Γa and follows from the definition of norming and of substitution. Similarly, e.g. in case of structural rule ⊕ x ( , ) 1 we have a = ⊕ x (a 1 , a 3 ), b = ⊕ x (a 2 , a 3 ), and a 1 → 1 a 2 . By inductive hypothesis a 1 Γ = a 2 Γ . By Lemma 5.48 we know that a 3 Γ,x:a 1 = a 3 Γ,x:a 2 . Therefore a Γ = [ a 1 Γ , a 3 Γ,x:a 1 ] = [ a 2 Γ , a 3 Γ,x:a 2 ] = b Γ .
Lemma 5.51 (Context extension). For all
Proof. Obviously Γ 1 , Γ 2 |= a implies that FV ([Γ 1 , Γ 2 ]a) = ∅. Therefore the additional declaration x : b will never be used when evaluating a Γ 1 ,x:b,Γ 2 . Hence the successful evaluation of a Γ 1 ,Γ 2 can be easily transformed into an evaluation of a Γ 1 ,x:b,Γ 2 with identical result. For the consequence, Γ ⊢ a means that Γ ⊢ a : b, for some b. By the property just shown this implies Γ |= a.
We introduce a norm-based induction principle that we will use several times in the following proofs.
Definition 5.53 (Induction on the size of norms). The size of a normā is defined as the number of primitive constants τ it contains. A property P (Γ,ā) is shown by norm-induction iff for allb we know that: If P (Γ,c) for allc of size strictly smaller thatb then P (Γ,b). This can be reformulated into a more convenient form for its use in proofs.
• Inductive base: P (Γ, τ ). Computable expressions are organized according to norm structure and satisfy a number of additional conditions necessary for an inductive proof of strong normalization. 
Remark 5.55 (Motivation for the computability conditions). The four conditions are motivated by the strong normalization condition for applications (Lemma 5.45(1)) and negations (Lemma 5.45(2)) and by the need for a monotonicity argument of computability with respect to injections and case distinctions. Proof. Proof by norm-induction onā follows directly from the definition of computable expressions.
We begin with some basic properties of computable expressions.
Lemma 5.57 (Basic properties of computable expressions). For all Γ, Γ 1 , Γ 2 , a, a 1 , a 2 , b, x:
(1) a ∈ C Γ ( a Γ ) and a → b imply b ∈ C Γ ( a Γ ).
(2) Γ 1 |= a 1 , a ∈ C Γ 1 ,x:a 1 ,Γ 2 (ā), and a 1 → a 2 imply a ∈ C Γ 1 ,x:a 2 ,Γ 2 (ā).
Proof. For (1), we assume that a ∈ C Γ (ā) where a Γ =ā. Obviously a ∈ S and therefore also b ∈ S and by Lemma 5.50 we obtain b Γ = a Γ . We have to show that b ∈ C Γ (ā): It is easy to prove the computability conditions, since from b → c we can always infer a → c and hence use the corresponding condition from the assumption a ∈ C Γ (ā). For (2) the proof is by norm-induction onā and only requires properties 5.48 and 5.50 of norming.
The closure of computable expressions against negation is shown first due to its frequent use in other monotonicity arguments. Proof. Assume that a ∈ C Γ ( a Γ ). Letā = a Γ . By definition of norming obviously ¬a Γ =ā. We show that a ∈ C Γ (ā) implies ¬a ∈ C Γ (ā) by norm-induction onā.
Inductive base: We haveā = τ , therefore the computability conditions become trivial and it remains to show that ¬a ∈ S. Since a ∈ S, we can apply Lemma 5.45(2) whose conditions (C 1 ) and (C 2 ) become trivial since by definition of norming and Lemma 5.50 they imply thatā = τ .
Inductive step: Letā = [b,c] for someb andc. First, we show that ¬a ∈ S. Since a ∈ S, according to Lemma 5.45(2), for any x, b, c, we need to show conditions (C 1 ) amd (C 2 ):
Since a ∈ C Γ (ā), by computability condition β we know that b ∈ C Γ (b) and c ∈ C Γ (c). By inductive hypothesis ¬b ∈ C Γ (b) and ¬c ∈ C Γ (c) and therefore obviously ¬b, ¬c ∈ S. • (C 2 ): Let a → ⊕ x (b, c). Since a ∈ C Γ (ā), by computability condition α we know that c ∈ C Γ,x:b (c). By inductive hypothesis ¬c ∈ C Γ,x:b (c) and therefore obviously ¬c ∈ S. Therefore we know that ¬a ∈ S. It remains to show the computability conditions for ¬a:
α We have to consider two cases:
(1) ¬a → [x : a 1 ]a 2 or ¬a → [x!a 1 ]a 2 for some x, a 1 , and a 2 . By Lemma 5.7 (1, 3) we know that a → ⊕ x (a ′ 1 , a ′ 2 ) for some a ′ 1 and a ′ 2 where a ′ 1 → a 1 and ¬a ′ 2 → a 2 . The first part of α can be argued as follows:
(by Lemma 5.57 (1, 2) , since a ′ 1 → a 1 and ¬a ′ 2 → a 2 ) a 2 ∈ C Γ,x:a 1 (c) For the second clause, for any d ∈ C Γ (b), we can argue as follows: where ¬a ′′ 1 → a ′ 1 and ¬a ′′ 2 → a ′ 2 . This means that ¬¬a ′′ 1 → a 1 and ¬¬a ′′ 2 → a 2 . Since a ∈ C Γ (ā) and a → [a ′′ 1 ⊕ ′ a ′′ 2 ] by computability condition β we obtain a ′′ 1 ∈ C Γ (b) anf a ′′ 2 ∈ C Γ (c). By inductive hypotheses (applied twice) we know that also ¬¬a ′ 1 ∈ C Γ (b) and ¬¬a ′ 2 ∈ C Γ (c). By Lemma 5.57(1) we get a 1 ∈ C Γ (b) and a 2 ∈ C Γ (c). γ We have three cases: First, if ¬a → [x .
= a 1 , a 2 : a 3 ] for some x, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , then by Lemma 5.7 (5) we know that a → [x .
= a 1 , a 2 : a 3 ]. Since a ∈ C Γ ([b,c]), by computability condition γ, we know that a 1 ∈ C Γ (b), a 2 ∈ C Γ (c). Second, if ¬a → [a 1 , : a 2 ]for some a 1 and a 2 , then by Lemma 5.7 (7) we know that a → [a 1 , : a 2 ]. Since a ∈ C Γ ([b,c]), by computability condition γ, we know that a 1 ∈ C Γ (b). The third case ¬a → [: a 1 , a 2 ] is shown in a similar way. δ Letb = [b 1 ,b 2 ] for someb 1 andb 2 . Let ¬a → [a 1 ? a 2 ] for some a 1 and a 2 . By Lemma 5.7 (6) we know that a → [a 1 ? a 2 ]. By computability condition δ we know that
Closure of computability against application has a proof that is not very difficult but somewhat lengthy due to a repetition of similar arguments for the different computability conditions.
Lemma 5.59 (Closure of computable expressions against application). For all Γ, a, b:
The inductive base is trivial sinceā = τ . For the inductive step we first need to show that (a b) ∈ S. By Lemma 5.45(1) we have to show conditions (C 1 ) and (C 2 ). For any x, b 1 , c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 :
•
, by computability condition α, for any
, by Lemma 5.50 and by definition of norming we know thatb = [d 1 ,d 2 ] and henceā = [
) by computability condition γ we know that d 1 ∈ C Γ (d 1 ) and
,c]) by computability condition δ we know that
By inductive hypothesis (the sizes of [d 1 ,c] and [d 2 ,c] are both strictly smaller than that ofā), we know that (c 1 d 1 ) ∈ C Γ (c) and (c 2 d 2 ) ∈ C Γ (c). By definition of computability therefore (c 1 d 1 ), (c 2 d 2 ) ∈ S. Therefore by Lemma 5.45 (1) Therefore a 1 Γ =d and a 2 Γ,x:a 1 =ē. We have to show that a 2 ∈ C Γ,x:a 1 (ē) and that a 2 [x := d] ∈ C Γ (ē) for any d ∈ C Γ (d). We have to distinguish two cases:
(1) If (a b) → ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ) then by Lemma 5.6(5) we know that there are two subcases: (a) a → [y : a 3 ]a 4 , b → b ′ , and a 4 [y := b ′ ] → ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ) for some y, a 3 , a 4 , and b ′ . We can argue as follows: Since Γ |= (a b) we also know that b 1 Γ =b 1 and b 2 Γ =b 2 . We will show the first case b → [b 1 , : b 2 ], the proof of the second case is similar.
, by computability condition γ we know that b 1 ∈ C Γ (b 1 ). From a → [c 1 ? c 2 ], by computability condition δ we know that
Since the size of [b 1 ,c] is strictly smaller than the size ofā we can apply the inductive hypothesis to obtain (c 1 b 1 ) ∈ C Γ (c). Hence, since (c 1 b 1 ) → ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ), by Lemma 5.57(1) we have ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ C Γ (c). Therefore in both cases we have shown ⊕ x (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ C Γ (c). From computability condition α we obtain a 2 ∈ C Γ,x:a 1 (ē) and a 2 [x : 
We can show the second part of α as follows: (1) we have a 1 ∈ C Γ (d) and a 2 ∈ C Γ (ē). γ We have to distinguish three cases:
= a 1 , a 2 : c] for some a 1 , a 2 , and c then, since Γ |= (a b), by Lemma 5.50 we have
Similar to the corresponding case for condition α we can shown that [x . = a 1 , a 2 : c] ∈ C Γ (c). By computability condition γ we know that a 1 ∈ C Γ (d) and a 2 ∈ C Γ (ē). We now show the remaining closure properties of computable expressions. 
Proof. For all Γ, x, a, b, c,ā,b,c: To prove computability of all normable expressions, due to Lemma 5.61, we need to prove the stronger property that normable expressions are computable under any substitution of their free variables to computable expressions. First we need to extend the notion of substitution.
Definition 5.62 (Extended substitution). The substitution operation a[x := b] to replace free occurrences of x in a by b can be extended as follows: Given sequences of pairwise disjoint identifiers X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and (arbitrary) expressions B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) where n ≥ 0, a substitution function σ X,B is defined on expressions and contexts as follows:
Definition 5.63 (Norm-matching substitution). A substitution σ X,B where X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) is called norm matching w.r.t. Γ iff Γ = (Γ 0 , x 1 : a 1 , Γ 1 . . . x n : a n , Γ n ), for some a i and Γ i and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have, with σ abbreviating σ X,B :
Norm-matching substitutions indeed preserve norms: Proof. Proof is by induction on the number k of identifiers in X and follows directly from the definition of norm-matching substitution.
As a consequence of Lemma 5.64, for any norm-matching substitution σ we have Γ |= a if and only if σ(Γ) |= σ(a). We now come to the last piece missing to show strong normalisation.
Lemma 5.65 (Normability implies computability). For all Γ and a: If Γ |= a then for any norm-matching substitution σ X,B w.
. As a consequence normability implies computability.
Proof. Letā = a Γ and let σ = σ X,B be a norm matching substitution w.r.t. Γ with
The proof is by induction on a with context Γ:
• a = τ : Obviously σ(τ ) = τ and τ ∈ C σ X,B (Γ) (τ ).
• a = x : We have Γ |= x andā = x Γ . There are two cases: • a = ⊕(a 1 , . . . , a n ): We have Γ |= a and Γ |= a i . Letā = a Γ ,ā i = a i Γ . By inductive hypothesis σ(a i ) ∈ C σ(Γ) (ā i ). By Lemmas 5.58, 5.59, and the various cases of Lemma 5.60 we obtain ⊕(σ(a 1 ), . . . , σ(a n )) ∈ C σ(Γ) (ā). By definition of substitution this is equivalent to σ(⊕(a 1 , . . . , a n )) ∈ C σ(Γ) (ā). • The remaining case a = [x .
= a 1 , a 2 : a 3 ] can be argued in a similar way. For the consequence, we just take the empty substitution σ (),() which is trivially normmatching.
Hence we know that normability implies computability. Lemmas 5.52 and 5.65 together yield strong normalisation. Proof. Assume Γ ⊢ a. By Lemma 5.52 this implies Γ |= a. By Lemma 5.65 this implies a ∈ C Γ ( a Γ ). Obviously this implies a ∈ S. Definition 5.67 (Normal form). If a ∈ S then N (a) denotes the unique expression to which a is maximally reducible. Note that this definition is well-founded due to confluence of reduction (Theorem 5.26). Furthermore, due to strong normalisation (Theorem 5.66), Γ ⊢ a implies that N (a) exists.
We note an easy consequence of confluence and strong normalization.
Corollary 5.68 (Decidability of the typing relation). For any expression a and context Γ there is a terminating algorithm such that Γ ⊢ a iff the algorithm is not failing but computing an expression b with Γ ⊢ a : b.
Proof. The algorithm to attempt to compute a type b of a is recursive on the structure of a under the context Γ. It basically works by checking the typing conditions on unique normal forms.
5.4.
Consistency. Due to confluence and the strong normalization result for valid expressions it is often sufficient to consider the normal form N (a) instead of the expression a itself when proving properties about expressions of d. In this section, we study this more rigorously and use a characterization of valid normal forms to show consistency of d. The following Lemma shows that N indeed characterizes the normal forms of valid expressions.
Lemma 5.70 (Normal forms of valid expressions). For all a where ⊢ a we have that a ∈ N iff N (a) = a Proof. Obviously, by construction, all elements of N are irreducible. For the reverse, we prove the more general property that for all a and Γ with Γ ⊢ a we have that a ∈ N implies N (a) = a. The proof is by induction on a with context Γ.
We need a couple of easy lemmas for the consistency proof. Proof. Since FV (a) = ∅, by definition of D we know that a / ∈ D. We need to check the following remaining cases (1) a is the primitive constant, a protected definition, an injection, a sum, or a product, and ⊢ a : [x : b]c: By definition of typing and properties of reduction this cannot be the case. dependent product and it does not use a typing relation that can be interpreted as set membership. Instead d introduces a number of operators which can be functionally interpreted by untyped λ-expressions by stripping of the type tags and negations, interpreting both sum, product, and protected definitions as binary pairs and both universal and existential abstraction as λ-abstraction. The typing rules of d then induce a relation between untyped λ-expressions. Furthermore, d has computationally-irrelevant proofs, i.e. it is not possible to extract for example primitive recursive functions from valid expressions. This constitutes a major difference to well-known typing systems such as Coq [4] . In this section we discuss the use of d as a logic and then discuss several extensions of d. Hence one could argue that no further logical operators (apart from the law of the excluded middle) seem necessary. We do not follow this argument in d because, as we have already argued in Section 1, due to the typing rules of the core of d declarations such as x : τ cannot be instantiated to functions [x : a]b. This limitation of expressive power is a drawback of such encodings. To overcome this limitation, we could introduce abbreviations for expression schemas, e.g. In Section 4.1 we have shown that based on the type system of d many logical properties of these operators can be derived without further assumptions. Furthermore, based on a strong normalization result we have shown (Theorem 5.74) that d is consistent in the sense that the type [x : τ ]x is empty in d under the empty context. In this sense, d can be seen as a (higher-order) logic where typing can be interpreted as a deduction typing to the proposition it has deduced [16] .
However, in order to have the complete properties of classical negation, additional axioms have to be assumed and we did not show consistency of the type system under these axioms by means of strong normalization. Similarly, formalization of mathematical structures in d must be done axiomatically. In this sense the expressive power of d is limited and each axiomatization has to be checked for consistency.
Furthermore, there are two important pragmatic issues which differ from common approaches:
• First, inference systems for higher-order logic based on typed-λ-calculus such as [5] [28] typically make a distinction between the type of propositions and one or more types of individuals. In d, one the one hand there is no such distinction, all such types must either be τ itself or declared using τ . On the other hand, due to the restricted formation rules which are necessary to ensure uniqueness of types, in d, τ does not allow to quantify over all propositions of d and additional axioms schemes must be used when reasoning with formulas of complex structure. However, all these operators may also be used to define meaningful functions over propositions. Finally there is no explicit equality operator in d, a notion of equality is defined indirectly only through equality of expressions modulo reduction 6.3. Complete internalization of negation properties. In d a subset of the logical properties of negation are encoded into the reduction relation. Additional axioms schemes must be assumed to have the full expressiveness of logical negation. While this is adequate when assuming computationally irrelevant proofs, it leaves the open issue of consistency of the axiomatic extensions, i.e. the question if typing with negation axioms (cf.Section 4.1) is consistent. We briefly discuss this drawback of d.
Several approaches have been proposed to internalize classical reasoning into λ-calculus. λµ-calculus is adding classical reasoning to λ-calculus by additional control operators [27] , see also [3] . More recent approaches work can be found in [7] and [21] .
In Section 3.3.3 we have explained that the direct encoding of negation of a as [a ⊢ ff], where ff abbreviates [x : τ ]x, is not possible due to the use of λ-structured types and negation axioms for reduction. This is a major obstacle to completely internalize negation properties into d, since encoding negation in the above style is very common in logic. A second obstacle towards this goal is due to the use of a case distinction operator in d. In particular, the axioms β 3 and β 4 require an injection for resolving the case distinction. Hence it is not possible to reduce, e.g. [ [x : b] x ? [x : ¬b]τ ](a) where a is an inconstructive proof a : [b + ¬b], rather, one would have to somehow add non-deterministic function application operators to d. This phenomenon seems to be a consequence of Lafont's critical pairs ( [12] ). Note that d is using a simplified setting as we do not deal with general cut elimination, which would correspond to a function composition operator, but only a more specific elimination operator where a function is applied to an argument.
To illustrate this issue in a more concrete way, suppose we would, along the lines of [3] , define a negation-introduction operator [x : µ a, b] by means of the following typing rule: However, in order to normalize expressions so as to prove consistency of the system based on normal forms, we would have the need to define reduction rules for [x : µ a, b]. First of all, it is not possible to reduce a negation-introduction as an argument of a case distinction, i.e. when normalizing a function with a sum domain. Note also that there are fundamentally different approaches towards classical logic in type system, e.g. in [24] a modular approach is proposed where various logical foundations can be combined with type systems.
6.4. Extensionality of the reduction relation. Possible extensions of the reduction relation with extensionality axioms are shown in Table 9 . In our presentation of d we have not considered the law of η-reduction which is an obvious point of extension (η-reduction was included in the system λ λ in [14] ). Variants of the η-rule for existential abstractions, sums and products could be added as well.
[a.1, a.2] → 1 a (η 4 ) [a.1 + a.2] → 1 a Table 9 : Additional extensionality axioms for the reduction relation 6.5. Abbreviation systems. Complex systems of abbreviations spanning over several conceptual or abstraction levels play a major conceptual role in mathematical work. A multitude of proposals for incorporating definitions into typed λ-calculi have been made, e.g. [10] [15] [19] . Support for definitional extensions for systems closely related to Automath's Λ have been investigated in [13] . While support for definitional extensions is undoubtedly important, in our setting, they have not been necessary to formulate d. Note that in other settings this might be different and abbreviation systems become indispensable, e.g. [23] . In our case, these concepts must of course play a major role in any practically useful approach for formal deductions based on d.
